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ABSTRACT 
Geologic estinlates ofrenta~ivi:;:  giohcil petroler~n~  resor~rcesplace  abotrt5096 ir1  the 
Pt~rsiarz  Gt~lf  Prodrrctiorr costs are estinlared at Sj  per barrel there, arid S15per barrel irt  the 
ni~rtlr  Sea arrdA/~r.~k-r.  Crsijig ntorhenrntical ntethods deritedfronl depletiori theory, the presetzt 
talt~c.  ofecorronric reri/,front  oii is oil the order ofS20 trilliort.  Game theory is utilized to explnirz 
tltc. SjS-SIO per  barrel price bartd that exisfedfrom  1986 lu 1999.  iWu, ecorlomicforces hoie 
disl~laced  //iispretiowsly  smble I)orrent; a t1e11,price  rarrge ofS22 to S28 may be emergiilg. 
Iri~err~afioirirl  tradc~  irr  priroli.trr7t  arrd corrt~errtior7nl  n,enpoizs  are arralyxd u,ith ecottontetric 
nietliods; tire occlirrertce of rrr~clenr  w,eapotls cnpabililq; iri the Persiari Gtrlf regiorl is explored. I.  Introduction 
In  1980, shortly aRer Saddani Hussein assumed the Presidency of Iraq, that country 
attacked Iran in the southivest Khuzistan region.  Iraq sought control over two major geographic 
goals: the Shatt-al-Arab channel, a shipping route for export of Iraqi oil; and the petroleum 
production facilities in Khuzistan, where more than 75% of Iran's oil resources were located.' 
In 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia.  If Iraq had been successhl 
in these military actions, it would have controlled 40% of identified global reserves and 75% of 
Persian Gulf reserves (see Table 1). 
In  1991, U.S. President George Bush supported a U.S.-led U.N. military coalition which 
defeated Iraq, emphasizing that, "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of 
friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell 
into the hands of Saddam Hussein"  (Yergin, 1991, p. 773).  This military action eliminated Iraq's 
potential to raise crude oil prices and attain quasi-monopoly profits.  Yet five years earlier, then 
Vice-President Bush had flown to the Persian Gulf, meeting with Saudi government ministers and 
the King.  The purpose of this 1986 trip had been to raise crude oil prices, which at the time were 
below $10 per barrel. 
The purpose of our analysis is to illuminate part of the economic rationale for these 
superficially contradictory U.S. policies.  We shall show the magnitude of the economic incentives 
for control of Persian Gulf oil, and also the logic which led the U.S. and some other OECD 
nations to work against crude oil prices below $15 per barrel, and above $20 per barrel for a 13- 
See Yergirj (1991 j  and the ir~rrn~nrio!~n/  Perro/errnl E~l~ciopedia  (19833. 
3 :: 
b:  includes Oman, Brunei, Qatar, and Bahrain, in addition to the 5 countries mentioned 
Table 1: Estimates of \Yorld  Conventional Crude Oil Resources (billion barrels, 1993) 
Kuwait + Neutral  Zone 
includes other regions and countries 
Former Soviet Union 
United States 




na: not available 





















427.7  1513.3 year period from 1986 through  1999. The same incentives operate now to create a new, higher 
price range of potentially comparable stability. 
The first seciin identifies the magnitude of economic rent (defined below) which partially 
motivates foreign policies of the Gulf countries and the U.S. It uses game theory logic to explain 
the $15-$20 per barrel range in which crude oil prices usually moved.  The next section analyzes 
the framework now evolving toward a price range.  The third part analyzes global military trade in 
the context of petroleum imports and exports. This is followed by  a brief summary of the grouth 
in nuclear weapons capability in  the region.  Then we summarize the pre-1980 history of Gulf 
production and international relations.  We conclude with a discussion of future implications for 
the early pan of this Century, and the likelihood of a near-term price range of $22 to $28 per 
barrel. 
n.  Petroleum Price, Rent, and Game Theory, 1986-1999 
in the petroleum economics trade literature, $5 per barrel is widely used as the likely 
equilibrium price in a theoretically competitive world oil market working without production 
quota agreements (Adelman, 1986 and 1993; The Economist,  1999; Yergin,  1991). 
Table 2 illustrates the production cost in a low-cost area in the Persian Gulf, and also for 
the Xonh Sea.  "Production cost" here means exploration, development, lifting, and shipping 
costs to an OECD consumer.  It inciudes a normal return on investment ("profit"),  and allowances 
for depletion and risk factors. However, for purposes of discussion, assume average Persian Gulf 
cost is $5 per barrel, and Yiorth Sea (and Alaskan) cost is $15 per barrel. 
In other words, if the market price is $15 per barrel, a Persian Gulf producer earns "rent" Table 2: Illustrative Production Cost 
Possible Low Persian Gulf  Possible North Sea Cost 
I 
Cost  I 
Investment in Development, 
amortized (including profit) 
Operations, lifting  !  25r! 





included in operations 
$15 of $10 per barrel above the $5 per barrel production cost.  At  $25 per barrel, the rent is $20 
With Gulf production typically 6 or 7 billion barrels per year, to;al  rsonomic refit above 
production cost was on the order of $120 billion annually in early 2000. 
Mathematical techniques can be used in economic modeling to analyze the potential 
surplus or rent associated with use of the world's remaining oil resources.  (Remaining resources 
are the sum of (a) identified reserves, and (b) geological estimates of undeveloped or unexplored 
petroleum resources).  Equation (1) shows the basic objective of a hypothetical monopolistic 
world oil industry: 
T 
subject to  q,  2 S. 
,=I 
The logic is straightforward. hTV  is the net present value of rent, the excess of revenue above 
cost.  The demand functions P(N,Y,q)  shift upwards over time in response to rising global 
population (N)  and per capita income (Y).  Revenue is P*q, and cost is C. In the denominator, r 
represents the interest rate in calculating net present value.  Remaining resources are S. The 
second line in the equation notes that future cumulative oil use cannot exceed remaining 
resources. 
The goal, then, is to maximize h'PV  for producers by finding T, the optimal length of time for remaining production, and the best annual production levels q,.  (For a full explanation of this 
mathematical technique applied to .rvorld oil, see Chapman and Khanna, 2000, and Chapman, 
1993*.) Of course the same method can be applied to an assumption of a competitive market. 
The results are summarized in  Table 3. In Table 3, the magnitude of the present value of 
producers' rent is generally $15 to $20 trillion.  (The exception, Case 4, has a lower WV  of $5.5 
trillion). 
Gross World Economic Product now exceeds $30 trillion.  The magnitude of economic 
rent above cost for world oil producers is comparable but smaller.  The incentive for Iraqi-type 
military actions is clear, as is the incentive for OECD and other nations to oppose monopolistic or 
single-nation influence in  the Persian Gulf. 
Notwithstanding the magnitude of economic surplus potentially available to a monopoly, 
crude oil prices were usually in the $15 to $20 per barrel range from 1986 through 1999.  A 
competitive market would have had lower prices (eg.  $5), and a monopolistic market would have 
higher prices (e.g. $30) during the last decade.  Yet, since the Bush trip to Saudi Arabia in 1986, 
world oil prices were in the $15 to $20 range for 10 ofthe 13 years (hIER, various issues) 
U'e believe that economic, political, and military factors led both OECD consumers and 
OPEC producers to prefer the $15-20 per barrel range, as summarized in Table 4.  Consider U.S. 
net imports of petroleum, which have risen slowly and have passed the 50% level for total 
In these optimal control analyses, the problem is addressed with continuous rather than discrete tiinctinns 
With the utilization of the shift in demand functions that is induced by grofrzh in population and per capita income, the 
solutions show (a) in all cases, a long period of accelerating use followed by decline, @)prices in the near term are 
stable, dec!ining slightly, or increasing, depending upon near term assumpticins about production cost trend and he 
exercise of market power as analyxd in the game theon. discussion following, md  (c) nem term price trajectories are all 
followed by continuing price rise Table 3: Economic Rent and Oil Use 
Case  T: optimal production  IVPV:  net present value of 
period until depletion 
(years) 
economic rent above cost 
(trillions) 
- 
1  Competitive market 
2. Monopolistic market 
3. Competitive market until 
2030, then monopolistic 
4.  Competitive, but 
substitute biomass or coal 
liquid fuels available at 
$50 per barrel 
5. Monopoly with substitute 
fuels available at  $50 per 
barrel 
Solirce: Chapman and Khanna (2000) Table 4:  General Economic Irnp~et  of Crude Oil Price Decision 
in a Game Theorg- Framework: 1986-1999 
Price per barrel 
$10 or less 
OECD Countries 
Hieher  -  GKP growth 
Shut some domestic production 
Greatly increased oil 
consumption 
Much more imports 
More pollution, climate change 
End Persian Gulf political 
support by OECD oil industry 
Persian Gulf Oil Producers 
loss of political support from 
OECD oil industry 
lower revenue, greater volume 
faster depletion 
higher market share 
stable GV  growth 
stable OECD oil production 
sloi~  groiv~h  in oil consumption 
slow gro~lh  in impon share 
*  stable prices 
continued Persian Gulf support 
continued OECD political, 
military support 
stable revenue, profit, rent 
$30  /  decline in GhT grou-th  /  loss of OECD political, military 
rapid near-term growth in 
domestic production 
stable or declining consumption 
OECD Persian Gulf support 
opposed by  oil consumers 
support 
increased incentives for Central 
Asia, other non-OPEC 
production 
less market share 
less production, more profit, rent 
*  greater payoff to successful Iraq- 
/  type action consumption,  The US  production is costly; production cost in the Persian Gulf is not. 
Consequently, low crude oil prices increase U.S. dependence on imports in  two ways.  High cost 
US.  production has to be shut down when crude prices are near $10 per barrel on a long-term 
basis.  Second, U.S. consumption of oil increases with lower prices.  The end result is that crude 
prices in the $1 5 to $20 per barrel range avoided financial loss for American oil producers, slowed 
the decline in U.S. production levels, and encouraged U.S. political support for Persian Gulf 
governments threatened by  Iraq or other forces seeking monopoly power over Persian ~ulf  oil.' 
Consider Japan's position in supporting the military defense of Kuwait by the U.S.-led 
operation. Japan imports essentially all of its petroleum.  Three-fourths of its crude oil has 
originated in the Persian Gulf region (USEIA, 1994, p. 52).  In the short run, it would benefit 
from a $5 to 510 per barrel world price.  But, if Persian Gulf oil drives out U.S. and North Sea 
producers, the resulting monopoly-influenced  price would increase significantly.  With a long run 
perspective, Japan can depend upon stable prices and political stability for iis supply, both 
supported by the U.S.  (Yergin, 1991, pp. 759-760). 
Table 4 lays out these and related points in a game theory framework.  Both Persian Gulf 
and OECD governments were accustomed to the $15 to $20 per barrel price range.  Either group 
acting alone could, for a short period, force prices in either direction.  However, both groups had 
incentives to keep prices in this range.  This is similar to the game theory concept ofNash 
Eqrrifibrium: a status quo where neither side can improve its overall situation by changing its 
strategy  An initiative by either group acting alone, if opposed by the orher side, leads to 
consequences which leave the initiator worse off than previously.  A game theory approach is 
This discussion of Tshlc 4 is based upon the game theory analysis in Chapman and Khanna (2000j 
1  l intended to represent the previously noted interaction of politics, military defense, and economics 
in world oil markets.  This $15 to 520 per barrel level was far below a true monopoly price.  It 
was also far above a tmly competitive world price.  The outcome in  one narrow facet resembled a 
competitive market: world price was about at the level where it equaled the marginal cost of high 
cost producers. 
In 1998, cash prices for Persian Gulf oil declined to $10 to $15 per barrel.  The primary 
cause may have been a cessation of accelerated growth in  petroleum consumption in Asia. 
Throughout most ofthat year, futures prices remained within the $15-$20 per barrel range.  With 
the downward pressure on 1998 cash prices, the 1999 response could be anticipated which would 
raise cnde  oil  prices 
111.  2000: E~olution  to a Higher Price Band 
As the year 2000 began, Jaffee and Manning reported in the policy journal .Foreign AfSairs 
their prediction of "The high probability of oil prices in  the $12 to $20 range over most of the 
next two decades  . . ."  Their analysis was in sharp contrast to ours, published in this journal  at the 
same time (Chapman and Khanna, 2000). 
In early 2000, crude oil prices had risen from a low of $10 in late 1998 to a high of $34 in 
early 2000, and temporarily stabilized near $25.  The U.S. Energy Secretary had negotiated with 
Saudi Arabia, hrfexico, and some OPEC members, seeking a new political agreement on a higher 
price band to replace the old $15 to $20. 
The President of OPEC recently articulated the political economy of the game-theory 
framework analyzed by us above and in earlier publications.  An  extensive excerpt follows (KYT, April 2000): "If prices fall belo\\  $22, Lve  will cut production to push prices back up.  When 
prices are above $28, we will increase production." 
Several trends converged to move the game theory equilibrium to a higher price range. 
Inflation since 1986 would restate the $15 to $20 target range as $22 to $29 in year 2000 dollars4 
This matches nearly perfectly with the current target price range.  On the OPECFG side, a feeling 
of entitlement to inflation-adjusted prices seems to be matched by an OECD acceptance of the 
validity of this point. 
Notwithstanding the new and higher price range, the ability of Europe and Xorth America 
to respond to high prices by  increased production in Alaska and the North Sea is increasingly 
weakened.  Alaskan production is reduced by 50% from its 1988 peak (hCER,  2000).  In the 
North Sea, increased production may be financially and physically feasible, but Noway's 
coordination with OPEC reduces the comperiti\.e power ofthis option. 
iyithin the international oil industry, the accjuisition of iilobil, Amoco, ARCO, and 
Standard of Ohio by Exxon and British Petroleum has eliminated the potential competitive 
influence of four previously independent major global oil companies.  Exxon, BP, and Royal 
Dutch Shell are no longer in an adbersarial position with Pers~an  Gulf countries with respect to 
price. 
BP, because of its dominant position in Alaska and its major positions in the North Sea 
and the Persian Gulf, is particularly well placed to benefit from and implement new pricing 
arrangements 
4  Assuming the GDP dcfln;or inircascs about 44% from 1986 to mid-2000  The increase to 1999 itas  42% 
ECKP, SCB 2000). 
I3 As noted. Norway does not see itself as a price competitor.  Mexico as well as Noway is 
now coordinating production planning with Persian Gulf and OPEC countries. 
On the demand side, continued grouth in U.S petroleum consumption and the resumption 
of gronth in Asian consumption has resumed the pattern of continuously rising demand curves. 
Each year, at any given price, more petroleum will he consumed than previously. 
Taken together, these six factors (inflation, the decline in Alaskan and U.S. output, the 
stabilization of North Sea production, Noway and Iv4exico coordination with OPEC, 
consolidation among major oil companies, and the resumption of upwardly shifting demand 
curves) combine to create a new calcul~s.~  The game theory framework is still intact, but the new 
price range has been articulated as $22 to $28 (in current dollars), rather than the prior $15 to $20 
range. 
It is too early in the evolution ofthis new stage to be confident.  Nevertheless, we 
speculate that tarset prices will continue to define OPEC/PG-OECD policy in the near future. 
The price-per-barrel values in  Table 4 should be redefined accordingly. 
The same logic on each side continues  For example, the US.  Congress threatened to 
terminate U.S. military support to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  The U.S.  Secretary ofEnergy 
negotiated with Persian Gulf, OPEC, and Mexican governments.  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other 
Persian Gulf countries led OPEC, Norway, and Mexico to increase production and tower prices in 
March 2000 (NYT, March 2000). 
The duration of the new $22 to $28 target price range is uncertain.  However, the game 
'  In addition, the U.N. conrrol of Iraqi production and the decline of Russian production have reduced ourput 
from these traditional major pioduccrs (MER, 2000). 
14 theory logic continues intact beyond the demise ofthe old 1986-1999 price range 
R. Arms Trade and the Oil Economy 
The economic incentive underlying military activity in  the Persian Gulf has been 
established in the previous sections. Here we examine the global arms trade in the context of the 
oil economy and determine the empirical significance of a few key nations in this context. 
Based on a comprehensive global data set, Table 5 determines a fairly close empirical 
relationship between world trade in conventional weapons and the trade in crude oil and refined 
petroleum products: arms exports (imports) are highly correlated with oil imports (exports) 
Exploring this relationship are a pair of regression models based on a cross section of 121 
countries for 1995. The regression coefficients have the expected sign given the results in Table 5 
Arms variables are measured in million dollars whereas the oil variables are in billion dollars. 
Thus, according to these regression results, a $1 billion increase in total oil imports yields a $0.16 
billion increase in  the exports of conventional weapons, on average.  Similarly, a $1 billion 
increase in the total volume of oil exports results, on average, in a $0.11 billion increase in the 
value of arms imports.  It is interesting that in  both models variables measuring the size and 
overall economic health of the economy, namely GhT  and GNP per capita, were found to be 
insignificant explanatory variables. 
In  the regression Equations (2) and ,il.  A%\fEXP a:13  ARMiW are ams exports and impom TOLLMP 
and TOILEXP are total impons and expolls, and F. represents error terms.  The sources for the=  data are the same as 
those in  Table 5. The figures in parenthesis are the helsroscedaslicih consistent 1-ralios based on Viiite's 
heteroscedasticity consislcnt standard error estimates.  See Creene (1 997) for details.  As expected, no evidence of 
autocorrelation was found.  The regression slope coeficients are significant at the 5% level in both models. Table 5: Correlation Coefficients 
Correlation of 
Arms exports  with  Oil imports 
Arms imports  with  Oil exports 
Total arms trade  with  Total trade 
Total arms trade  with  Total oil trade 
Total trade  with  Total oil trade 
Variable definitions: All data are for 1995 
Arnts exports (inports): value of conventional weapons exports (imports) 
Arnts trade :  sum of arms exports and arms imports 
Oii inyjorts (e.r/,orrsj:  total volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imports 
(exports) 
Toral rrode:  total value of merchandise imports and exports 
Data sozrrces: ACDA 1997 and 1998, WTO I 999, USEIA 1996. To identi6 the key countries in this context, consider Table 6, which provides details on 
the value of arms transfers between the major supplier and recipient countries.  It is clear 
from this table that more than 50% of the global exports of conventional arms between 1991  and 
1996 originated in  the United States, followed by  the United Kingdom at a distant second.  Saudi 
Arabia was the single largest recipient of these weapons, receiving almost three as times as high a 
value of arms imports as the next highest recipient, Egypt.  Other countries in the Persian Gulf 
region, particularly Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. are also significant importers of 
conventional weapons, each receiving approximately $800-$1000 million per year.7 
Drawing together the statistics on arms trade presented above, the crude oil reserves data 
in Table 1, and country specific details on the imports and exports of crude oil and refined 
petroleum products (USEIA 1998), we can identify the key countries in the international oil- 
conventional weapons economy.  It is clear that, in general, the worlds largest arms exporters are 
7  For detailed countn specific arms iniports and exports data see various issues of he  World Mil~tary 
Expenditure and Arms Trade reports puhiished annuali!  h!.  [he United Stales Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Tahle 6:  Value of Arms Transfer i)elivcrics by  Major Supplier and Ileeipient Country 
(('t~niulative  1904- 1900. millions of  cttrrcnt dollars) 
OPEC  36,080  15,150  12,915  1,625  3,040  190  525  940  85  310 
Iran  1,025  0  0  320  0  0  500  10  10  80 
Kuwait  3.405  1,900  675  750  60  0  0  0  0  20 
Saudi Arabia  26,585  11,700  1 1,200  0  2,000  60  0  775  0  0 
UAE  2,270  800  260  200  750  0  0  0  0  20 
NATO  25,525  18,150  1,195  230  1,300  1,470  40  1,785  580  45 





Other  All 
Rast  Other? 
Asia also the largest oil importers, whereas the countries with the largest remaining and identified 
crude oil resources are the largest recipients of~iiric  zm:s. 
V.  Instability, Locill Conflict, and Nuclear \Yeapons 
The hliddle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia are usually considered distinct regions. 
However, a broader network of national tensions overlays the Persian Gulf region.  Five of the 
world's nuclear-capable  countries have borders within 1600 miles of the Straits of Hormuzs In all 
cases, existing missile range capability makes nuclear aggression in the Persian Gulf region a 
technically feasible option (see Table 7). The other two nuclear capable regions, the United 
States and the European Community, are both major importers of Persian Gulf oil. 
Figure 2 shows countries with nuclear warheads and their oil production.  The apparent 
association is spurious, in  the sense that crude oil production does not cause nuclear capability. 
There are at least seven sets of national rivalries that have involved nuclear-capable countrie~.~ 
The simplest interpretation of the Figure is that most of the conflicts associated with nuclear- 
capable countries have the potential of affecting the Persian Gulf 
Pakistan, though not a major oil producer, borders the Gulf of Oman and the Indian 
Ocean.  A nuclear conflict involving India and Pakistan would probably impact Persian Gulf 
shipping and perhaps production  A Pakistan strategy might potentially involve the threat of 
8 
From West to East  Israel, Russia, Pahstan, India, China  See map (Figure  1) 
Since World War I1  Israel-&ah  countries: Pakistan-India. Ind~a-China;  Russia-US.: France and U.K- 
Russia; Russia-China; China-US Table 7: Nuclear Weapons 
Name and historj  Arsenal  Representative Missile Range 
(number of  warheads)  fmiiwi 
I. Counrrirs with declared nuclear weapons capabilities 
L'nited  States  12,070 
First test: 1945 
Total number of tests: 1.030 
United Kingdom 
First test: 1952 
Total number of tests: 45 
France 
First test: 1961 
Total number of tests: 210 
22,500 
First test: between 1945-1952 
Total number of tests: 715 
First test: 1964 
Total number of tests: 45 
India  -  65  1  .500 
First test: 1974 
Total number of tests: 6 
2. Counrries with undeclared nuclear weapons capabilities 
m 
Known to have bomb 
Pakistan  15-25  930 
Began secret program in  1972 
3.  Countries that terminated nuclear weapons programs 
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, KazaMtstan, Ukraine, South Africa. 
Source: Time Maqazine, 1998. Figure 1: The Persian Gulf and Surrounding Regions 
Source: http:f/w.~b.utexas.edu,~~bJPQ/Map-~11tctiorziddte~~h~ nuclear detonations in  the Gulf to encourage OECD support for the Pakistani position on 
Kashmir. 
Petroleum revenues received from the OECD by  Guif producers probably do not directly 
finance conflict in what, for lack of an established term, we might call the "Straits of Hormuz 
global sector".  But individuals an3 organizations in  the Gulf countries finance military operations 
in other countries in  this sector." 
W.  A Historicai Perspective on Persian Gulf Policy 
Throughout the 20Ih century, the Guif was of considerable interest to the U.S.,  European, 
and Russian governments.  The Anglo-Persian Oil Company preceded the British Petroleum 
Company.  Both companies 'vorked  to provide a secure supply of petroleum for the United 
Kingdom during the earlier decades of the centur).  As was typical. British companies simply 
assumed the responsibilities of government in  their concessions in Iran's oil regions: customs, 
police, taxation, telegraph, education, and banking (Upton, 1961; Chapman, 1983).  Russia, on 
the other hand, sought, rather unsuccessfull~,  to promote Soviet republics in Northern Iran.  From 
1953 to 1978, Iran's policies were coordinated with US.  interests, as is well known (e.g., Yergin, 
1991; Roosevelt, 1979). 
In Saudi Arabia, four U S  oil companies established economic relations with the Saudi 
government  Originally formed in  1933 as the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, 
ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) managed Saudi oi! after Wi%'II (AIUii1C0, 1960, 
"  It has been assencd that sources in Saudi Arabia and Iran supper? Muslim milira3 operations in Kashmir 
(~Va~alior~ai  Geograpliic, 1999 Yergin, 1991).  \+'bile the companies no longer exert such control, the relations between the Saudi 
and the U.S. government remain strong, as discussed above. 
Each Persian Gulf country has an analogous individual history that fits into the larger 
mosaic of oil production and historical retations with European and U.S.  companies and 
governments 
V11.  Summary: Implications for International Policy 
Historically, Europe, the United States, and Russia have sought to secure access to 
Persian Guif oil.  Its low cost and high volume of remaining resources continue to place the Gulf 
at the center of petroleum geopolitics. The magnitude of economic rent above cost is on the 
order of $1  5-20 trillion. 
hlilitary power has played a significant role in policy.  Iraq, in its invasions of Iran and 
Kuwait and its threat to Saudi Arabia, has sought control over one-haif of the world's remaining 
oil resources.  The U.N. alliance, led by  the United States, eliminated Iraq's military power, and 
continues to control Iraq's military capabilities as well as its oil sales. 
Thus far, international policy in  the Gulf is the result of diplomacy, military action, and 
economic relations, setting the $15-20 per barrel price range outlined above during the last 13 
years of the last Century and creating a higher target price range in 2000. 
Production from Alaska and the North Sea continues to decline while world consumption 
grows  Mexico and Norway have initiated effective coordination with Saudi Arabia and OPEC 
(h'TT,  1999)  The ability of OECD producers to increase production to force lower prices is 
lessened  In addition, consolidation among major petroleum companies has reduced the cornpeiitive potefitia! of the industn 
In combination with the resuniption of upwardly shifting global demand functions and 
inflation, these six factors (see Sections 11 and 111) keep the political econorny/garne theory 
structure intact, but raise the target price range to $22-$28 per barrel. 
In the late 1990s, weapons trade became closely associated with petroleum trade, as 
analyzed above. As nuclear weapons capabilities slowly spread, an unexpected byproduct of 
nationai rivalries has been the creation of a geographic pattern in which five of the nuclear powers 
are within 1600 miles of the S~rairs  of Horni:~  The other nuclear powers are major consumers 
of Persian Gulfoi!  Iraq would probably have nuclear warheads today if not for the U.N.kT.S 
control over its military res"  ~~rces 
\Ye  do not suppose that \ve can suggest or advocate practical new policies to stabilize 
politics, prices, and producrior~ Ile  hope this analysis delineates some of the economic and 
securit!  motivation for more explicit international policies in  this context. References 
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